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 Abstract 
This paper treats illegal landings as a moral hazard problem that arises, since 
individual catches are unobservable to society and hence private information. A 
tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information prob-
lem is formulated as a solution to problems with illegal landings. The incentive 
scheme uses fish stock size as the tax variable, and can be seen as an alternative 
to a control policy. Rough estimates from a simulation study suggest that the 
incentive scheme is potentially useful. The incentive scheme also has potential 
application as an instrument to the solution of by-catch and discard problems. Table of contents 
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1.  Introduction 
Regulating industries by output control where output is costly to observe can 
run into problems with unreported outputs (for example pollution). In fisheries 
this problem arises as illegal landings, discard and by-catches, see Clark (1985) 
and Copes (1986). In figure 1 the magnitude of this problem is illustrated for 
cod in the North Sea. 
 
Figure 1: Intended and actual fishing mortality for the North Sea cod 
Source: Svelle et al (1997) 
 
It is seen that the actual fishing mortality is generally much higher than the in-
tended fishing mortality. This is partly due to misreported landings and discard. 
Indeed Svelle et al (1997) claim that for cod in the North Sea discards are 22% 
of the catch weight and 51% of the number of caught fish. Discard is also a ma-
jor problem within the European Union (EU) (Commission (1992a)), and at a 
global level Alverson et al (1994) show that by-catches and discard pose prob-



















unreported catches undermine this purpose. This leads to threaten stocks and 
low economic returns in the sector. 
 
In the literature there is, however, some confusion with respect to the content of 
the concepts of illegal landings, by-catches and discard. Following Alverson et 
al (1994) illegal landings are defined as catches in excess of the quota sold 
through out illegal channels. Discard is the portion of the catch returned to the 
sea and by-catches are discard plus incidental catches, where incidental catch is 
retained catch of non-targeted species. High grading arises when the less profit-
able part of a catches is discarded. 
 
In this paper attention is restricted to illegal landings even though the economic 
incentive scheme analysed here has potential application to the solution of 
problems associated with discard and by-catches. The problem of illegal land-
ings is viewed as a problem that arises because individual catches cannot be ob-
served. In effect this is a moral hazard problem, since an endogenous variable is 
unobservable, see for example Laffont and Tirole (1993). Based on the work of 
Holmstrom (1982) on moral hazard in teams and Segerson (1988) on non-point 
pollution, a stock tax/subsidy mechanism is presented, simulated and discussed. 
The proposed mechanism is similar to the mechanism proposed in Sergerson 
(1988). In both cases an individual pays on the basis of the full damage an ac-
tivity courses in order to eliminate free-riding. However, there are four differ-
ences from Segerson (1988). Firstly, for example, Kolstad (2000) argue that the 
mechanism functions best in small groups. This point is easily seen from the 
analysis in this paper. Secondly, the mechanism is simulated, and the simulation 
results show that the variable tax is surprisingly low. Thirdly, the tax structure 
is different because of the resource stock restriction. It is shown that the tax  
must be based on the user cost of the resource stock. Fourthly, another informa-
tion structure is assumed. Segerson (1988) assumes that one variable is unob-
servable to both actors. In this paper individual catches is unobservable to soci-
ety and the stock size is unobservable to the fishermen. This difference is due to 
different policy problems analysed. 
  
9
Some comments on the economic literature on discard and by-catches are use-
ful. Copes (1986) discusses possible solutions to high grading problems. It 
might be possible to reduce discarding to a tolerable level by fine tuning regula-
tions. Separate quotas might be given for different species or for different fish 
sizes that have different values per unit weight. Anderson (1994) analyses the 
economics of high grading in terms of the operating decisions of individual ves-
sels. The study shows that it can be socially optimal to high grade with landing 
constraints that are costly to relax, and that individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs) can cause high grading when it is not socially optimal. Arnason (1994) 
develops a dynamic model that explicitly considers different grades of fishes to 
examine the catch discarding problem. The study shows that in a differentiated 
fishery discarding of catch may be socially optimal. Sampson (1994) develops a 
model for selection of fishing locations by a fisherman faced with two species 
whose densities vary with distance from the port. The study shows that trip quo-
tas can be effective in protecting a species only when the two fish stocks are 
reasonably well separated. Boyce (1995) considers two fisheries – one for a tar-
get species and one for a by-catch species. The by-catch rate is positively re-
lated to the harvest rate of the target species. The study shows that a competi-
tive ITQ system is c apable of maximising social welfare, but that there must 
exist quota markets for both target and by-catch species. The approach taken in 
this paper is different from these approaches since it is argued that individual 
catches are unobservable due to illegal landings. Indeed, the existing literature 
fails to acknowledge that illegal landings and discard arise because catches are 
unobservable. 
 
Some comments on the literature of illegal landings are also worth mentioning. 
Based on the economics of crime (Becker (1968) and Stigler (1971)), the litera-
ture studies fishery enforcement (Andersen and Sutinen (1983), Sutinen and 
Andersen (1985), Milliman (1986), Anderson and Lee (1986), Anderson (1987) 
and (1989), Neher (1990b), Sutinen (1993) and Charles (1993). Two fundamen-
tal results are established. Firstly, with costly enforcement it will not be optimal 
to ensure complete compliance. Secondly, in such situations it can be expected 
that illegal activity occurs on the basis of marginal returns to individual deci-
sions. The approach taken makes it necessary to have a control policy, and the  
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world wide policy response to the problems associated with illegal landings 
have been such a policy. In the EU, the control policy is judged to be ineffec-
tive, see for example Commission (1992b) and Jensen (2000). It is therefore 
important to search for alternatives to a control policy, and the mechanism pro-
posed in this paper can be seen as an alternative. 
 
In section 2, a theoretical analysis of the proposed mechanism is presented, 
while section 3 contains a simulation study of the incentive scheme. Problems 
associated with the mechanism are discussed in section 4, and section 5 con-
cludes the paper. 
2.  Illegal landings and the incentive scheme 
Imagine an industry consisting of n fishermen and let society impose a total 
quota on the industry. No matter which allocation scheme is chosen, there will 
be a compliance problem with a total quota system, see Copes (1986). 
 
In the present paper, individual catches are assumed to be unobservable due to 
illegal landings, whereas total catches are assumed to be observable due to 
measurement of the fish stock. This setup is similar to individual pollution in 
the non-point pollution literature, see Hanley et al (1997) for an overview.
2 It is 
well known that there are random fluctuations and errors in measuring the stock 
size. However, two points are worth mentioning in this respect. Firstly, the 
problem is also considerable in the measurement of pollution in the non-point 
pollution literature. Secondly, observable catches are partly the basis for the 
stock calculations. Therefore, part of the measurement problem associated with 
stock size is due to unobservable catches. By using the stock tax proposed here, 
all catches are made observable, and therefore the stock estimate will become 
more precise. In other words the proposed mechanism can be used to reveal the 
private information about catches that the fishermen have. 
 
                                                                 
2  Non-point pollution is defined as the case, where individual pollution cannot be measured.  
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Segerson (1988) proposes a tax/subsidy mechanism as a solution to non-point 
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x is the observable actual size of the fish stock. 
 
x* is the optimal stock size. 
 
Ti (x) is the tax function for fishermen i. Note that the fish stock is the basis for 
the tax, since individual catches cannot be observed. 
 
ti is the tax/subsidy rate, which can vary between fishermen. 
 
ki is a fixed penalty. 
 
The proposed mechanism functions as follows. At the start of the year, society 
announces a tax/subsidy formula, and at the end of the year society may for ex-
ample collect the tax. Two interpretations of the tax are possible. Firstly, soci-
ety can announce x*. In this interpretation (1) becomes an alternative to a total 
quota policy. Secondly, on the basis of a growth function, the optimal aggre-
gated catches, h*, can calculated and a total quota on h* can be announced in 
combination with (1). In other words, both h* and x* are announced. Now the 
stock tax is an alternative to a control policy. The second interpretation is cho-
sen, since it is probably easier for the fishermen to understand a total quota, 
since catches, and not stock size, is their choice variable. 
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What is of interest is calculating ti and ki (section 2.3).
3 In order to calculate the 
variable tax rate and the fixed penalty, the optimal catches must be calculated 
(section 2.1). Further a model for fishermen behaviour is needed (section 2.2), 
since the first-order condition for a fisherman must be set equal to the condition 
for optimal catches in order to find ti and ki. 
2.1.  Optimal catches 
For society, individual catch for fisherman i, h i, is assumed to be a stochastic 
variable because of the compliance problem associated with the total quota. e is 
a random variable associated with individual catches, but in the notation  e is 
submitted. Society is assumed to be interested in maximising expected long-run 
economic yield in steady state.
4 In other words, the interest is in maximising the 
sum of expected resource rents, subject to the restriction that the natural growth 
rate equals the sum of expected catches. The assumption regarding the individ-
ual cost function, c i(x, h i), is that costs are linear in x and h i up to a capacity 
limit hi.
5 It is assumed that dci/dhi > 0 and dci/dx < 0. The choice variables are 
catches and stock size, see for example Neher (1990a). Therefore: 
                                                                 
3  The implication of this is that x* need not to be derived, when the variable tax rate and the 
fixed penalty is calculated. x* is only of interest if Ti (x) is to be calculated. 
4  By focusing on steady-state, discussions of adjustment to equilibrium is excluded. If exoge-
nous prices and linear cost functions are assumed the optimal adjustment path will be a bang-
bang control, see Conrad and Clark (1991). If, for example, costs are assumed to be non-
linear, a gradual adjustment to steady-state is optimal. An approximation to the optimal ad-
justment path in the non-linear case can be obtained by using a feed-back control, where the 
next period´s optimal stock size is related to current variables. An example of using a feed-
back rule is to be found in Sandal and Steinshamn (1997). Theoretically, there is nothing 
wrong with calculating optimal compliance taxes, as proposed in this paper, by using feed-
back rules. However, the fundamental principle is more easily illustrated by restricting atten-
tion to the steady-state equilibrium. A further restriction is that the discount rate is assumed to 
be zero. In most advanced fishery economics society is assumed to maximise present value of 
future resource rents, see Clark and Munro (1978). Optimal stock exploitation can be given a 
capital theoretical interpretation and optimal control theory can be used to solve the problem. 
As with the discussion of adjustment toward steady-state equilibrium, it is possible to con-
struct compliance taxes that include discounting. However, in order to avoid unnecessary 
complications, this analysis focuses on the long-run economic yield. 
5  The assumption about the cost function may be seen as arbitrary, but is selected in order to 




















p is an exogenous price. 
 
G(x) is the natural growth rate. It is assumed that G´(x) > 0 for x < x MSY and 
G´(x) < 0 for x > xMSY. Furthermore it is assumed that G´´(x) < 0. 
 
ESi is an expectation operator for society with respect to fisherman i. 
 




Because of the assumed linearity of the objective function the maximisation 
problem may be written as:
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  (5) 
                                                                 
with a capacity limit is used in Conrad and Clark (1991). However, the assumption is by no 
means critical, and it is theoretically possible to work with a more general cost function. 
6  Since dci/dx < 0, the derivative of the aggregated cost function with respect to stock size will 
also be negative, and G´(x*) < 0. 
7  If x is a stochastic variable, a rule is that E(a + bx) = a + bE(x).  
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(4) and (5) may be solved with a standard Lagrange method.
8 However, because 
the paper wishes to compare the optimal solution with the model for fishermen 
behaviour, another method is used. In this method (5) is solved to yield: 
 
) ), h ( E ( M x i Si ) (h E i i S - - =   (6) 
 
where ES-i(h-i) is a vector consisting of all other fishermen’s expected catches. 
(6) is an expression for how the steady-state stock is related to expected 
catches. Using M(ESi(hi),  ES-i(h-i)), a biological response function  dM/dEsi(hi) 
may be constructed. The biological response function indicates how the steady-
state stock responds to changes in expected individual catches. In optimum it 
will be the case that dM/dEsi(hi)< 0. 
 
Substituting (6) into (4) yields the following maximisation problem: 
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The first-order conditions are:
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p – dci/dEsi(hi) is the expected marginal resource rent, and the marginal resource 
rent will be positive in optimum. This occurs before the capacity limit. dci/dM 
dM/dEsi(hi) + ￿dcj/dM  dM/dEsi(hi) is equal to the expected marginal user cost 
of the stock. This can be seen if (4) and (5) are maximised by using a standard 
Lagrange method. The first-order condition for catches can be set equal to (8), 
and the result is reached so that l= dci/dM dM/dEsi(hi) + ￿dcj/dM dM/dEsi(hi), 
where l is a user cost for the fish stock. The expected marginal user cost con-
tains two effects. Firstly, increased catches will decrease the steady-state stock 
                                                                 
8  Thereby n + 2 equations and n + 2 unknowns is obtained. In this way it is seen why maximi-
sation with respect to x is necessary. 
9  It is assumed that dEsi(hi)/dhi = 1. This assumption is also adopted in Segerson (1988).  
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and thereby d ecrease the marginal cost reduction of the stock for fisherman i. 
dci/dM dM/d Esi(hi) captures this effect. Secondly, increased catches for fisher-
man i will decrease the marginal cost reduction of the stock size for all fisher-
men other than i. ￿dcj/dM dM/dEsi(hi) captures this effect. 
2.2.  Fisherman behaviour 
In this model, it is assumed that the stock size, not catches, is a stochastic vari-
able. The reason for this assumption is that the stock size depends on the collec-
tive actions of the fishermen. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to make catches 
a stochastic variable – the fisherman must be assumed to know their own illegal 
and legal landings. There is thus a difference between the information structure 
assumed in Segerson (1988) and the information structure in this paper. Seger-
son (1988) operates with one variable that is stochastic for both actors. Here, 
stock size is stochastic for the fishermen and individual catches for the society. 
The difference in information structure reflects the fact that different policy 
problems are analysed. 
 
The stock size is governed by a random variable, m, which is submitted in what 
follows. Furthermore, it is assumed that the fishermen maximise the expected 
resource rent minus taxes (the expected net resource rent). An assumption 
regarding the fish stock is also necessary. Since the regulator taxes the stock, it 
is reasonable to assume that the stock size is not an exogenous variable as as-
sumed in fisheries economics. One solution could be to let the maximisation 
take place over h i and x. However, x is not a traditional endogenous variable, 
since it depends on the collective actions of the fishermen. Instead, a function 
for fisherman i relating stock to catches is postulated (Ni(hi, h-i)= EFi(x), where 
EFi is an expectation operator for fishermen i). N i(hi, h-i) is an expression for 
how f ishermen i perceive that the expected stock size is influenced by catches. 
An e xample of N i(hi,  h-i) may be found in the formulation used in Jensen and 
Vestergaard (1999), where maximisation of the net resource rent occurs subject 
to the restriction G(x) – h i = 0. Jensen and Vestergaard include the restriction 
due to altruistic preferences. Here it is included due to the fact that the regulator 
taxes the fishermen on the basis of the fish stock. Arnason (1990) operates with  
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a model that is similar to this m odel, since the fishermen includes a resource 
restriction. However, Arnason assumes that M(hi, h-i) = N(hi, h-i), so the model 
presented here is more general, since a possibility is that M(hi, h-i) „ N(hi, h-i). 
Furthermore, the stock tax analysed in this paper is a good argument for the as-
sumption that the fishermen includes a resource restriction. dNi/dhi is fisherman 
i´s perceived biological response and it is assumed that dNi/dhi < 0. 
 
Since stock taxes are studied as an alternative to a control policy, a control pol-
icy can be excluded. The implication of this is that the fishermen in principal 
are free to choose their catches. In other words, the fishermen can exceed the 
total quota, as they will. Let us assume that the fisherman receives the same 
price for all landings. With expected net resource rent as the objective for fish-
erman i, and the assumed linearity of the objective function, the maximisation 
problem is: 
 




) , h ( ) x ( i Fi i h- N = E   (10) 
 
(9) can be rewritten. Let us call pi(Efi(x), x*) fisherman i’s perceived probability 
that the expected stock is larger than the optimal stock. It must be expected that 
dpi/dEFi(x) > 0. From (1) the expected total tax for fisherman i is: 
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Substituting (11) into (9), and (10) into (9), yields the following maximisation 
problem: 
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Neglect for a moment the tax component in order to interpret the first-order 
condition and compare the condition with the social optimal condition. In this 
case it must be assumed that  dNi/dhi = 0 – the fisherman neglect the resource 
restriction. Now the fisherman will catch where the marginal resource rent (p -
dci/dhi) is zero. This occurs at the capacity limit, h. From before hi* < h and the 
social optimal individual catch is less than the catch the fisherman wants. 
Therefore, a tax is imposed in order to secure that the individual optimal catch 
falls in line with the social optimal catch. (ti + ki dpi/dNi)dNi/dhi is the expected 
marginal tax costs for the fisherman and dci/dNi dNi/dhi is the user cost of the 
fish stock as perceived by the fisherman. It is assumed that dci/dM dM/dEsi(hi) 
+ ￿dcj/dM  dM/dEsi(hi) > dci/dNi dNi/dhi. In other words the social user cost is 
larger that the user cost as perceived by the fisherman. A difference between the 
social optimal first-order condition and the first-order condition for the fisher-
man is that the effect that catches has on other fishermen is not reflected in (13). 
This captures a basic problem with illegal landings. Each individual fisherman 
does not take into account the effect that illegal landings have on other fisher-
men. 
 
Now t i and k i that will secure the optimal individual catch and thereby remove 
the incentive to land illegally can be calculated. 
2.3.  Optimal tax structure 
First Q = dci/dNi dNi/dhi - dci/dM dM/dEsi(hi) - ￿dcj/dM dM/dEsi(hi) is defined. 
Q can be said to measure the marginal net expected social benefit of having the 
fisherman e xceeding the optimal catch (illegal landings). As mentioned above 
there will be a difference between the expected user costs for fisherman and so-
ciety. dci/dNi dNi/dhi – dci/dM dM/d/Esi(hi) - ￿dcj/dM dM/dEsi(hi) captures this 
effect and the difference is negative. Therefore, there is an expected net social  
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cost associated with having the fisherman exceeding the optimal catches 
through illegal catches. 
 
Note now that dci/dhi = dci/dEsi(hi) because of the assumed linearity of the cost 
function. By equating (13) and (8) the result is reached that the tax may be set 
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The possible tax structures are as follows. Firstly, the fixed penalty may be set 
to zero and the variable tax rate to the marginal expected net social costs from 
exceeding the optimal catch divided by the fisherman’s biological response. 
The fisherman´s biological response must be included since the tax influence 
catches though out the stock effect. Secondly, the variable tax rate may be set to 
zero and the fixed penalty to Q divided by the marginal probability change mul-
tiplied by  dNi/dhi. Thirdly, the fixed penalty may be set arbitrary and t i to the 
expected marginal net social cost minus the fixed penalty multiplied by the 
marginal probability change times the fisherman biological response divided by 
dNi/dhi. Fourthly, the variable tax rate may be set arbitrary and the fixed penalty 
to Q minus the variable tax rate multiplied by the fisherman biological response 
divided by the marginal probability change multiplied by  dNi/dhi. Segerson  
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(1988) also arrives at a tax formula with four possibilities. However, a differ-
ence is that the response functions is reflected in the tax in this paper. The rea-
son for this is restrictions on the maximisation problems. 
 
Note that the tax structure eliminates free- riding. To see this, let us concentrate 
on tax structure a, and assume full information so that the expected values van-
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From (15) it is seen that the fishermen pay on the basis of the difference in user 
costs. Therefore the fisherman also pays for the damage that he imposes on the 
other fishermen and thereby the full marginal costs that illegal landings gener-
ate. In this way free riding is eliminated and compliance with the total quota is 
ensured – the incentive to illegal landings is avoided. If a fixed penalty is in-
cluded, k i does not distort the marginal incentives, so free-riding is still elimi-
nated. In the more general case, with asymmetric information, free-riding is 
also eliminated, since the fisherman pay on the basis of the full marginal costs 
that illegal catches generate. These results are analogous to the result in Seger-
son (1988). 
 
On the basis of (15) a criticism of the suggested tax can be raised. It can be ar-
gued that the marginal cost reduction, due to a marginal increase in the stock 
size, will be little when calculated on an individual level (dci/dNi and dci/dM 
will be numerically small). Therefore, the value of the variable tax rate will be 
so small that it does not influence marginal incentives to exceed the optimal 
catch. For this reason the tax works best when the fishery is restricted to a lim-
ited number of fishermen. Therefore, the simulation results in section 3 are 
conducted for cod in the Kattegat. However, this criticism is not correct. When 
dci/dNi and dci/dM is numerically small the biological response for fisherman i 
(dNi/dhi) will also be numerically small. In other words, when the stock size  
20 
does not have much influence on the fisherman’s profit, the fisherman will not 
take much account of the effect that catches have on stock size. This effect will 
tend to make the variable tax rate larger and therefore there are two effects of 
opposite directions. It can therefore be concluded that when comparing a low 
and high numerical value of  dci/dNi  and dci/dM, nothing definite can be said 
about ti, because of differences in dNi/dhi. 
3.  Simulation results 
Now some simulation results for cod in the Kattegat are presented. The reason 
for selecting cod in the Kattegat is that it is a relativly small and restricted fish-
ery. Concentration is put on tax structure a and full information is assumed. The 
interest is to get a rough indicator for the magnitude of the variable tax rates.
10 
For this reason individual variable tax rates have been calculated for six vessel 
groups: 
 
  - Netters under 20 GT. 
  - Netters over 20 GT. 
  - Danish Seiners. 
  - Trawlers under 50 GT. 
  - Trawlers between 50 GT and 199 GT. 
  - Trawlers over 200 GT. 
 
                                                                 
10  In principle an interest could also be to calculate total tax costs. This would, however, not be 
reasonable for the following reasons. With the assumed non-linear cost function a gradual ad-
justment to x* will be optimal. Therefore a year must be selected where x is close to x*. For 
cod in the Kattegat, a logistic growth function has been estimated on the basis of stock size 
and aggregated catches reported in appendix 1. This yields K = 170496 tonnes (see appendix 
1) and therefore xMSY = 85248 tonnes. Since F´(x*) < 0, x* > 85248 tonnes, but the actual 
stock size is of maximum 44 856 tonnes. Therefore the actual tax costs will be seriously over-
estimated. This conclusion holds for another reason. The procedure in section 2 was that the 
regulator announced a tax formula ((1) and (15)) at the start of the year and then collected 
taxes based on observable variables at the end of the year. By using this procedure society se-
cures that x are close to x* - in theory x = x* and total tax revenue for society will be zero. By 
using actual stock sizes to calculate total tax costs, the effect that announcement of a tax for-
mula would have on x, is excluded.  
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Individual variable tax rates have been calculated for the average vessel within 
these groups for 1971-1998. If the vessels are assumed to be homogenous 
within these groups, the taxes are also variable tax rates for the other vessels in 
the groups. Six groups have been selected since an interest is in focussing on 
the size of the tax difference that eliminates free-riding. 
 
It may be concluded that the fishermen face a variable tax, not a variable sub-
sidy, every year. In appendix 1 a logistic growth function is estimated and K = 
170496 tonnes. Now x MSY = 85248 tonnes and in optimum G’(x*) < 0, so x* > 
85248 tonnes. But x is in the period 1971 –1998 at maximum 44856 tonnes, so 
x* > x. 
 
Some assumptions have been adopted in order to keep the simulations simple. 
A more general cost function is introduced. It is assumed that  dci/dhi > 0, 
d
2ci/dhi
2 > 0, dci/dx < 0, d
2ci/dx
2 > 0 and d
2ci/dhidx < 0. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that there is full information for both actors, and that Ni(hi, h-i) = s M(hi, 
h-i) with s < 1. s = 1 is the case described in Arnason (1990), but s < 1 allow for 
the fishermen to take some notice of the biomass growth constraint. This will 
result in larger catches and hence illegal landings. For cod in the Kattegat four 
cases have been simulated: 
 
  - s = 1. 
  - s = 0.8. 
  - s = 0.6. 
  - s = 0.4. 
 
The simulations require knowledge of an individual cost function. The follow-
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Appendix 1 contains all the details regarding the calibration including the em-
pirical model for the calibration of the parameters, and the data is also presented 
in appendix 1. Table 1 summarises the results. 
 
Table 1: The calibration results 
Group  lia a i (1000kr/tonnes)  lib b i (1000kr/tonnes) 
Netters under 20 GT    150.07    2174.822 
Netters over 20 GT    426.456    918.013 
Danish Seiners    198.51    1575.591 
Trawlers under 50 GT    195.75    869.868 
Trawlers between 50 GT and 199 GT    233.29    744.623 
Trawlers over 200 GT    31.820    4305.97 
 
Call n i the number of vessels in group i. Now the variable tax formular for an 
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Now the simulation results can be presented, see figure 2 - 7. 
 
Figure 2: Netters under 20 GT 

























































































































































A striking feature is that the variable taxes rates are low compared to the sales 
price – maximum 1200 DKK. per tonnes the actual stock size is below the op-
timal stock size.
11 This suggests that the tax is potentially useful. It is seen that 
if s is low, t i is high. This result is not surprising. If s is low, the market failure 
will be larger, and the variable tax rate must be large. The variation in taxes 
over time can be explained by variations in hi and M(hi, h-i). By differenting the 
tax function it can be shown that if catches is increased, the variable tax will 
also increase. Furthermore if M(hi, h-i) is increased, the variable tax rate will 
decrease. These f acts explains why the variable tax rate decreases over time. 
Note, however, that the proportion a vessel catch of the total catch is fixed at 
the 1997 level because of the lack of time series for hi. The variation in variable 
tax rates between vessel groups tends to eliminate free-riding. The difference is 
very low, which could indicate that a uniform tax could be used. However, the 
simulation results are based on simple assumptions about the individual bio-
logical response function. 
 
To sum up, the incentive scheme has potential application as a solution to com-
pliance problems associated with illegal landings within a total quota system. 
However, the following discussion points highlight some problems with the 
scheme. 
4.  Discussion 
Some aspects of the incentive scheme proposed here must be discussed further. 
It is a well known fact that fishermen are opposed to taxes since at least a part 
of the resource rent is exhausted, see Anderson (1986). The same conclusion 
applies to the mechanism discussed here, if the actual stock size is below the 
optimal stock size. Therefore, taxes has traditionally been seen as impossible 
within the fishery. Clark (1990) proposes a combination of a tax system and a 
system of ITQs to secure a fair sharing of the resource rent between society and 
the fishermen. Another solution could be to pay back at least a part of the col-
lected resource rent to the fishing industry as a lump-sum transfer. 
                                                                 
11  As already mentioned calculations of total taxes are meaningless.  
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A criticism of Segerson’s mechanism has been that it does not secure budget-
balance. This criticism is part of the motivation for the work by Xepapadeas 
(1991) and Govinsdasmy et al (1994) on non-point pollution. Xepapadeas pro-
poses a random penalty mechanism to the solution of non-point pollution prob-
lems, while Govinsdasmy  et al suggest an environmental ranking tournament. 
Even though it is relevant to discuss the environmental ranking tournament and 
the random penalty mechanism for a renewable resource, a fairly simple solu-
tion to the budget-balanced problem is to pay back the social benefit from fal-
ling in line with the optimal catches to the industry. Thereby, budget-balance 
can be secured. 
 
Furthermore the information requirements of the proposed tax mechanism 
could be discussed. This point is part of the motivation for the previously men-
tioned work by Xepapadeas and Govinsdasamy et al. Within fisheries econom-
ics, taxes has traditionally been criticised for posing to many information re-
quirements, see Arnason (1990). The tax structure proposed here raises even 
greater information requirements, since society at minimum must have informa-
tion about individual biological responses. This information can be obtained in 
surveys, but it is also possible to reduce the information requirements by adopt-
ing simplifying assumptions as in the simulation study. However, the informa-
tion demands is in practise not larger than the necessary information needed 
when the ambition is to regulate in an optimal fashion. Note also that the in-
creased information requirements are due to the fact that more realistic assump-
tions about the information structure are allowed. In other words, the paper is 
conducted within what Russell (1994) calls complex regulation. Under complex 
regulation more realistic discussions of regulatory regimes are allowed by 
dropping some of the simplifying assumptions traditionally used. The price of 
the increase in reality is increased complexity. The issue of complex regulation 
arises in another way. The regulatory structure that is proposed here is complex, 
since it combines the use of total quotas and taxes. However, it must be re-
marked that the regulatory structure within the EU fisheries is at least as com-
plex, see Jensen (1999) and Holden (1996). 
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The last point that must be discussed is the assumption that fishermen react to 
the stock tax by t aking some account for their effect on the stock. If the fisher-
men do not react in this way the tax would be ineffective – the fishermen would 
interpret it as a lump sum tax, which does not influence the marginal incentive 
to catch illegally for example. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper an economic incentive scheme as a solution to problems associated 
with illegal landings is presented. The economic incentive scheme is based on 
the work of Holmstrom (1982) and Segerson (1988), and can be seen as an al-
ternative t o a control policy. Since there are problems associated with illegal 
landings, it is assumed that society has imperfect information about individual 
catches. The stock size is assumed to be observable and is used as a tax base. It 
is argued that the incentive scheme makes all individual catches observable and 
therefore the estimate of the stock size becomes more precise. If the actual fish 
stock is above the optimal stock fishermen i receive a subsidy equal to the dif-
ference in stocks multiplied by a variable individual subsidy rate. In the case 
where the actual fish stock is below the optimal stock, society taxes the fisher-
men. The total tax is equal to the difference in stocks multiplied by a variable 
tax rate plus an individual fixed penalty. By the right selection of the individual 
tax/subsidy rate and the fixed penalty optimal individual catches can be se-
cured. Note also that free-riding is eliminated since the total marginal social 
cost of exceeding the individual optimal catch is the basis for the calculation 
basis of the tax/subsidy. Thereby, compliance with the TAC is reached. Simula-
tions for cod in the Kattegat reveal a striking result. The variable tax rates are in 
some cases only 3% of the sales price. Note, however, that the results of the 
simulations are very rough estimates of the actual tax rates. 
 
Two assumptions are worth repeating. Firstly, the analysis is based on maximis-
ing economic yield in steady-state. Therefore, the subjects of discounting and 
adjustment toward equilibrium are excluded. Theoretically, for example, feed-
back rules could be used in the calculations of the economic incentive. This 
constitutes an area for future research. Secondly, it is postulated that the indi- 
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vidual fisherman reacts to a stock tax by taking some account of the resource 
restriction. This assumption is most likely to be fulfilled if the total quota is al-
located to small groups of fishermen. 
 
In the introduction it was pointed out that by-catches and discard also pose 
problems with compliance to total quotas.  The tax mechanism can also solve 
these problems, and this also constitutes an area for future research. Another 
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Appendix 1: Calibration of the cost function and 
estimation of a growth function 
In this appendix the model on which the cost functions is calibrated is pre-
sented. Furthermore, a logistic growth function is estimated and an expression 
for M(hi, h-i) is found. 
 
  1.a Calibration of the cost function 
 
First to the model used for calibrating the cost functions. A model from Vester-
gaard and Jensen (2000) is adopted. The profit function for fisherman i is: 
 
) h , x ( c h p ) x , h ( i i i i i i - = p   (1) 
 
where pi is a constant price. 
 
The cost function is assumed to be linear in effort: 
 




  li is the cost per unit of effort. 
 
  ei(hi, x) is a effort function which specifies the effort needed to take a given 
catch with a given stock size. 
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Data is only obtainable for three years. Therefore data for 1997 is used to cali-
brate the parameters liai and libi. 
 
There is data on average prices (pi), costs (si) and harvest (hi). Hence an LP-
model can look like: 
 




i i h h £   (6) 
 
The constraint reflects that rations regulate the cod fishery. 
 
The first order condition of the LP model is: 
 
0 s p i i i = l - -   (7) 
 









-   (8) 
 




i i h 2
x ) s (
l
+ l








i i i i
b
- = a   (10) 
 
By running the LP model, a value for li  are found. Together with estimates for 
hi and x (table A.3), the parameters can be found. 
 
Information about average prices is obtained from Anon (1997). The average 
price of cod is calculated from information on revenue and catches. The vari-
able costs include all costs except depreciation and interest. The share of cod of 
the gross output is used to find the variable cost of cod. Table A.1 summarise 
the data. 
 
Table A.1: Data for the calibration, 1997 



















Gross output, cod 
1000DKK/ ton-
nes 
  368.4   1424.5    571.7    555.4    710.6    132.4 
Catch cod 
Tonnes 




  10.6    13.5    11.2    8.2    8.6    8.9 
Variable costs, 
1000 DKK 
  670.8   2327.9   1820.9   1233.5   3059.6   7002.9 
Share of cod    49.74    48.74    26.56    38.49    19.01    1.4 
Variable cost, 
cod 1000 DKK 
  333.7   1134.6    483.6    474.8    581.6    98 
Cost per tonnes, 
1000 DKK 
  9.6    10.8    9.5    7    7    6.6 
Source: Anon (1997)  
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The LP model provides the shadow prices in table A.2. 
 
Table A.2: Shadow prices, 1000 DKK 



















lI    1    2.7    1.7    1.2    1.6    2.3 
 
Inserting these into (9) and (10), gives the estimates in the text. 
 
  1. b Estimation of a growth function 
 
From Anon (1998) information about x and aggregated catches, h, for the pe-
riod 1971-98 is available. Table A.3 reports these. 
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Table A.3: Stock size, aggregated catches and natural growth rate 
Year  x, tonnes  h, tonnes  G(x), tonnes 
1971    42372    15732    16985 
1972    43625    17442    18673 
1973    44856    18837    14996 
1974    41015    21880    14667 
1975    33802    15485    19293 
1976    37710    16275    14467 
1977    35902    20119    14479 
1978    30262    13390    14924 
1979    31796    14830    12205 
1980    29171    13509    10209 
1981    25871    15337    9876 
1982    20410    12465    12869 
1983    20814    12828    12873 
1984    20959    11886    9958 
1985    19031    12706    8575 
1986    14900    9096    7306 
1987    13110    11491    7890 
1988    9509    5527    7320 
1989    11302    8590    5879 
1990    8592    5936    6833 
1991    9489    6834    8374 
1992    11029    6271    8160 
1993    12918    7013    12829 
1994    18734    7802    2942 
1995    13874    8165    4322 
1996    10031    6126    10416 
1997    14321    9461    6934 
1998    11794    6835   
Source: Anon (1998) 
 













  (11) 
 
This time series is reported in table A.4. 
 
Table A.4: Time series for individual catches 
Year  Netters un- 
der 20 GT, 
tonnes 
Netters over 















1971  58    175    85    112    138    25 
1972  64    194    94    124    152    27 
1973  69    210    101    134    165    29 
1974  81    244    118    156    191    34 
1975  57    172    83    110    135    24 
1976  60    181    88    116    142    25 
1977  74    224    108    144    176    31 
1978  49    149    72    96    117    21 
1979  55    165    80    106    130    23 
1980  50    150    73    96    118    21 
1981  57    171    83    109    134    24 
1982  46    139    67    89    109    19 
1983  47    143    69    92    112    20 
1984  44    132    64    85    104    19 
1985  47    141    68    91    111    20 
1986  34    101    49    65    80    14 
1987  42    128    62    82    100    18 
1988  20    62    30    39    48    9 
1989  32    96    46    61    75    13 
1990  22    66    32    42    52    9 
1991  25    76    37    49    60    11 
1992  23    70    34    45    55    10 
1993  26    78    38    50    61    11 
1994  29    87    42    56    68    12 
1995  30    91    44    58    71    13 
1996  23    68    33    44    54    10 
1997  35    105    51    68    83    15 
1998  25    176    37    49    60    11 
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Now to some considerations regarding the growth function. The data for x is 
from 1/1 in a year and the data for h is from 31/12 in a year. It is therefore ob-
tained that: 
 
t t 1 t t h x x ) x ( G + - = +   (12) 
 
The data serie for G(x) is also reported in table A.3. On the basis of the data in 









  r is the intrinsic growth rate 
  K is the carrying capacity 
 
Non-linear least square is used since parameters are correlated. The results is: 
 
r = 0,54 (6,96) 
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Note that K is insignificant. The reason for this is that K is large compared to x. 
 
  1.c. An expression for M(hi, h-i) 
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M(hi, h-i) is the function that is analysed in section 2. 
 

















  (16) 
 
To calculate the variable tax rates reported in section 3, information is also 
needed about the number of vessels in the six groups. These are reported in ta-
ble A.5. 
 
Table A.5: The number of vessels fishing cod in Kattegat, 1997 


















Number    61    3    32    113    32    1 
Source: Fiskeridirektoratet (2000) 
 
Now the variable tax rates can be calculated.  
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